Introduction
In 1992, the Government of Uganda embarked on an ambitious program of financial system liberalization as a means of consolidating the gains achieved during the economic recovery program (ERP) it had initiated in 1987. The reforms had two main objectives: to facilitate macroeconomic stability and to promote GDP growth by enhancing the efficiency of the financial system. The liberalization process involved policy and institutional reforms aimed at reducing the role of the government in the financial sector and allowing the market to play a greater role in the allocation of resources. The measures introduced centered around the removal of interest rate controls, restructuring financial institutions to enhance competition and efficiency, and improving the legal and regulatory framework for the financial sector.
The first eight years of Uganda's far reaching and relatively successful liberalization can throw light on the question posed by the title of this volume. We evaluate this experience at both macro and micro levels. At the macro-level, while policy makers would like to see how the behavior of interest rates is influenced by liberalization and the resultant impact on savings mobilization and financial depth, there are broader concerns on the effects of financial liberalization on macro-economic stability and growth prospects. In addition to studying the behavior of interest rates, we have used cointegration methods to test empirically whether financial savings, financial depth and growth could have been affected by financial liberalization in Uganda. At the microlevel, we test whether the rationale behind financial liberalization--improving competition and hence efficiency in allocation of resources--has been realized under the imperfect, heavily segmented market conditions that characterize the Ugandan financial system. We describe the segmentation in banking and document the contrasting performance of different groups of banks: state-owned, ex-colonial, prudent and aggressive. We also allude to the political economy of financial liberalization by assessing who are the winners and losers in the process.
Section 1 provides a description of the context, the initial conditions and the design phasing of the liberalization program. Sections 2 and 3 examine the impact at the macro and microeconomic levels respectively. Section 4 provides some information about quasi-fiscal subsidies flowing through the financial system. The paper concludes with an assessment of the lessons that can be drawn from the Uganda experience and their policy implications.
1.
The approach to liberalization
Macroeconomic Context
When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government came to power in Uganda in early 1986, it inherited an economy that had been shattered by almost two decades of economic mismanagement, political instability and civil war, reversing the gains from robust growth that had been witnessed in the first 8 years of independence 1 . Much of the country's economic and social infrastructure had been destroyed, production had stagnated, inflation was in three digits (300 percent in 1986) and the domestic currency was highly overvalued.
In May 1987, Uganda embarked upon an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) with the objective of alleviating poverty and improving the standards of living for its population. The program was supported by credits from the World Bank, IMF, and various donors. The program's main objectives focused on macroeconomic stability, liberalization of dealing in foreign exchange, trade, price, and marketing systems, improving the incentive structure and business climate to promote savings mobilization and investment, and rehabilitating the country's economic, social and institutional infrastructure. By the end of 1992, the Government had achieved considerable progress in implementing the ERP. Real GDP was growing at an annual average rate of 5.9%, the exchange and trade regime was almost fully liberalized, price controls were eliminated (except for utilities and petroleum products), and annual inflation was down to 30% from 240% in 1987. The foreign exchange system had been significantly liberalized with the introduction of forex bureaus to allocate non-coffee foreign exchange receipts to a variety of uses according to market demand and introduction of a weekly foreign exchange auction to supplement the import requirements beyond and above those catered for by the forex bureaus.
In spite of the progress since 1987, Uganda's economy in 1992 was still fragile and highly vulnerable to external shocks. Savings and investment remained very low (1 percent and 11 percent of GDP respectively), and inflation was still too high and uncertain to encourage long term business and other initiatives needed for sustained economic development. More importantly, the financial sector had major weaknesses and the inefficiencies associated with it contributed significantly to macroeconomic instability.
1.2
The state of the financial system before liberalization
For the early period after independence in the late 1960's, the financial system had expanded rapidly beyond the provision of crop financing to support internal trade and the growing manufacturing sector. By the early 1970s the economy had a reasonably well developed financial network complete with commercial banks, non-bank savings and housing finance institutions. As seen in Chart 1, M2/GDP (a measure of financial deepening) had risen to a peak of 24 percent in 1974, close to the values obtained by the neighboring countries of Kenya and Tanzania with ratio's of 28 percent and 27 percent respectively. Other financial indicators confirm the robust financial system performance at that time.
The sector suffered serious dislocation following the civil disturbances of the 1970s and 1980s. There was a rapid decline in the size of the monetary economy and the level of financial intermediation 2 . The financial system lost both the depth and breadth that it had achieved in the early 1970s and financial services became concentrated in a few commercial banks situated in the capital city, Kampala. Non-professional management and fraud became common within financial institutions and normal business discipline collapsed. Parallel markets in foreign exchange, trade and credit developed. The use of credit instruments such as checks and hire purchase declined. The currency was converted in 1987 and this further eroded the confidence in the financial system as a 30% conversion tax was levied; and this tax was seen as a confiscation of resources from the private sector by the Government.
In 1991, a financial sector review carried out by the World Bank found Uganda's financial system to be in a fragile state and identified several financial sector issues as potentially serious obstacles to sustained economic recovery and price stability. Public sector credit accounted for about 70% of total bank credit reflecting the substantial financial resources which were outside the allocative mechanism of the market. At the same time lack of confidence in the financial system (already dislocated by two decades of civil war, the currency conversion tax, and negative deposit rates in real terms) had dramatically lowered the ratio of M2/GDP to around 6%. (Figure 1 ) Financial repression in the form of controls on interest rates and directed credit had further contributed to the disintermediation of the financial system: by 1991 the ratio of credit to GDP had declined to four percent (compared to a peak of 18 percent in 1974) and cash in circulation as a proportion of money stock had risen to 53 percent (from 28% in 1974) . Savings in the banking system were clearly insufficient to finance the growing level of domestic investment needed to sustain economic growth.
At the macro-level, the dilemma facing the Government was that the financial sector and the macro-economy were struggling in a vicious circle. Negative real interest rates, high inflation, and associated expectations of devaluation had undermined confidence in the financial sector, resulting in a low savings rate, and a lack of monetary depth. In turn, the lack of monetary depth and other inefficiencies in the financial system had contributed to macroeconomic instability. Monetary discipline had been difficult to enforce and even relatively small fiscal deficits were generating large monetary and inflationary pressures because of the small monetary holdings in the economy; for example monetary financing of a deficit equal to 4 percent of GDP -not an unusually high figure -would result in a monetary expansion of almost 70% if M2 to GDP is only 6 percent. Although the government appeared to be coming to grips with stabilization, the damage done in earlier unstable periods, in terms of the effect of instability on the financial sector, continued to make fiscal deficits unusually dangerous.
Another avenue through which the financial system contributed to macro instability was through the government's policy of accommodating excessive lending by distressed "public sector" banks combined with little effort to recover loans. The Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) and Cooperative bank (COOP), which accounted for about two-thirds of the assets of the commercial banking system, were suffering from insolvency and an acute shortage of liquidity. Their combined overdrawn position with the Bank of Uganda (BOU) deteriorated from Sh 287 million at end-1987 to Sh 6034 million by the end of August 1989. This net overdraft implied a deficiency of reserves relative to statutory requirements equivalent to more than 30% of their total deposits. The resulting monetary stimulus was estimated to be greater than the arising fiscal deficit of that year. The main reasons for the overdrawn position of UCB and COOP included excessive lending and deteriorating recovery rates. Other factors that contributed to their liquidity problems included: (a) a rapid expansion of their branch networks and (b) an increase in the value of "items in transit", which represented hidden undeclared losses in their accounts. In this context, it must also be mentioned that liquidity was not a systemic problem in the commercial banking sector as a whole, but rather an issue that confronted public sector banks. Without the continuing support and subsidy of BOU, COOP and UCB would have ceased to operate.
At the sectoral level, the key structural characteristics of the financial system in 1992 which affected its efficiency were its relatively small size, extensive government ownership and control, and domination of the banking system by a state-owned commercial bank. The total assets of the financial system in 1992 was less than $0.5 billion, the size of a small bank in a developed country. The extensive ownership of the banking sector by the government was reflected in its equity holdings in the majority of the eleven commercial banks. The largest commercial bank UCB was state-owned, and the second largest bank COOP was owned by Government-dependent cooperatives, and government held a 49 percent equity holding in all five foreign banks. It also owned two development banks, the Post Office Savings bank (POSB), National Social Security Fund (NSSF), and 66% of the insurance business. The commercial banks dominated the financial sector and held 90 percent of the assets of the system. The UCB accounted for half of the banking business in terms of both assets and deposits. It also accounted for 85 percent of the total national branch network. 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 per cent M2/GDP Credit/GDP Deposits/GDP Figure 1 : Financial depth, 1970-98 In spite of the wide range of financial institutions, the system lacked instruments for the mobilization of savings, diversification of risks, and management of liquidity. There was lack of confidence in the existing, but limited, financial instruments (checks) as reflected by a high reluctance by the public to use checks as a system of domestic payments. The problem was emanating, not from the checks being stolen in transit, but rather in their misuse by the holders who would issue these instruments for payments with little or no surety of funds on account. The number of monthly checks being cleared at the BOU in 1989 was 12,305 compared to a peak in December 1970 of 135,502. In effect, Uganda had, by 1992 largely reverted to a cash economy. Capital markets and merchant banks were non-existent and the money market was in an embryonic state. There was no formal interbank market, with inter-bank lending only being conducted on an infrequent bilateral basis and the legal framework for promoting banking stability in Uganda was not satisfactory.
There was a fundamental problem of lack of financial discipline, which was exacerbated by a weak legal and regulatory system and lack of capacity of the central bank to supervise the financial system. The government was in large arrears with respect to payment to its contractors and its inability to repay combined with solvency problems at the two largest banks (UCB and COOP) led to a high risk of financial system instability. Another characteristic of the financial system was the internal/ external constraints facing the Bank of Uganda (BOU). Existing legislation fragmented responsibility for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy between the BOU and Ministry of Finance (MOF) and limited the power of BOU to enforce directives issued. At the same time, prudential regulation and supervision of banks and other 7 financial institutions was eroded by the lack of clarity in enforcement responsibility between the BOU and MOF. In addition, although the BOU lacked the capacity and skills necessary to effectively regulate and supervise the banking system, its role of prudential supervision was also undermined because BOU was forced to give precedence to government objectives, at times, at the expense of strict regulation and prudent banking. This is clearly seen in their policy of providing funds to public banks for onlending.
In the aftermath of the political and economic crises, transparency about the financial health of local banks and their clients was conspicuous by its absence. There were few good accounting and auditing firms and this made it difficult to rely on the quality of financial information produced by most of the local banks and firms. There was no regulatory body to oversee prudent accounting standards, and standardized accounting principles did not exist in Uganda at the time. At the same time, there were no commercial laws governing accounting requirements by private firms.
As already noted, a feature of Uganda's financial sector was the limited amount of bank credit extended to potential borrowers. A low deposit base, coupled with an inflationary environment and interest rate controls, curtailed the supply of credit. Moreover, formal sources of credit, especially those in the public sector, were under pressure not to finance trade and commerce and to make more lending available to agriculture and industry. The credit-worthiness of firms and individuals was compromised by such factors as lack of ownership titles (especially for the firms representing assets confiscated from departed Asians), over-indebtedness and insolvency, and the absence or outdated nature of financial accounts kept by the firms. Politicians contributed to the problems of loan delinquency by encouraging a culture of nonrepayment, especially of loans from government banks. There were cases of politicians taking loans on their own account and failing to pay while some encouraged their constituents to do likewise.
1.3
The elements, timing and phasing of liberalization
The process of financial liberalization in Uganda included the removal of interest rate controls, reduced barriers for the entry of new private banks into the system, restricting the direct role of Government in the allocation of financial resources including crop financing and divestiture of the Governments ownership in commercial banks. This process was complemented by parallel measures to strengthen bank supervision and foster financial discipline through new legislation and regulations, and policies to improve the efficiency and profitability of financial institutions. It is important to note that this liberalization did not include the capital account of the balance of payments.
Phasing and Sequencing of the Reforms
The liberalization process of the Ugandan financial system has been gradual and it is useful to distinguish the process between three major phrases.
Phase I -1987-1991: In this phase the focus was on macroeconomic measures to stabilize the economy, but the measures also included some steps to lay the groundwork 8 for financial sector liberalization. The financial sector also benefited indirectly through reduction in inflation which saw a shift towards positive real interest rates required to stimulate financial savings. The first significant steps towards financial liberalization were taken in July 1988 when the interest rates were raised by 10 percentage points. During 1989, authorities decided to adjust nominal interest rates in line with inflation to maintain positive real interest rates. Related reforms pertaining to the foreign exchange market were also instituted simultaneously to improve financial intermediation.
Phase II -1992 II - -1994 : The key liberalization measures were introduced in 1992, but controls on both interest rates and credit allocation were removed in several steps over a two year period. In 1992, the removal of interest rate controls affected treasury bill (TB) rates as the government switched from ad hoc issues to a market-based auction for determination of interest rates. From then, the key bank interest rates were linked to the weighted average of the TB rate as determined in the four preceding TB auctions. This move affected bank lending rates, bank deposit rates, and was also accompanied by a removal in credit ceilings, directed credit and a reduction in compulsory reserves at the central bank. The rates that were payable on time deposits remained subject to minimum limits while rates applicable to agricultural and development lending were subject to a ceiling. All the other rates were left to market forces. In 1994, the BOU fully liberalized interest rates and began to manage these rates through indirect monetary policy instruments with the TB rate as the anchor. In summary, while the 1992 represented a liberalization of the wholesale interest rates with other rates still pegged to TB rates, the moves in 1994 decontrolled all the remaining retail interest rates. The main focus was on the removal of controls on interest rates, but institutional reforms were also initiated. In particular, many of the legislative changes mentioned in Table 1 were enacted by parliament.
Phase III -1995 III - -1997 This phase focused on the development and strengthening of institutions to complement the policy and legal reforms made by the Government in the second phase. While full liberalization of interest rates had been completed in July 1994, the Government realized that the weak financial system had constrained the gains from the economic reform program. The financial system was still characterized by a high level of non-performing loans (over 50% of the total loan portfolio), high intermediation margins, violation of capital adequacy and/or insider lending limits by more than half of the commercial banks, and a lack of adequate provision of financial services outside the capital city. In order to address these weaknesses, the Government shifted focus to institution building measures. These included: strengthening of the central bank to enable it to enforce the regulatory framework developed in the previous phases, an expedited program of divestiture of government holdings in commercial banks, and a mechanism for the resolution of bad debt (with the creation of NPART to recover UCB's bad loans).
To complement the interest rate liberalization, several other measures were introduced to increase the competition and efficiency in the financial sector. These measures were aimed at facilitating the entry of new domestic and foreign banks, exit of non-viable banks, and to reduce the role of the state in the allocation of credit (Table 1) . The Government also took active measures to reduce its equity ownership in banks. It has over several years sold its shares in privately owned foreign banks. In 1997, after attempting to restructure UCB for about 3 years, the government put UCB up for sale on an "as is" basis and sold 49% of its shareholding to a private strategic partner who was also given management control. Other measures included a major program to upgrade legal and regulatory framework to enhance market discipline and competition among the private sector banks.
Impact and Consequences of Liberalization at the Macro Level
Given the objectives of the reform program, the two most important questions at the macro level concern the impact that financial sector liberalization has had, firstly on the Governments efforts to maintain macroeconomic stability and secondly on Uganda's growth prospects. There are two methodological difficulties in addressing these questions directly. Firstly, as shown in Table 1 , the program has been introduced gradually over a number of years and some of the measures such as the divestiture of state ownership in banks were only completed a year ago. In that sense, it may be a bit early to have a full assessment of the impact of the liberalization at the macroeconomic level. In essence, this poses limitations on the use of time series and econometric analysis. Secondly, it is difficult to distinguish between the impact of financial sector liberalization and the effects of other fundamental reforms that the Government has instituted since 1987, as part of the ERP. These reforms, which included measures to contain the fiscal deficit and trade policy reforms, also made a major contribution towards attaining macroeconomic stability and improving the environment for investment and growth.
In these circumstances, we take a more modest approach and also assess the main channels, suggested by economic theory, through which financial sector liberalization is likely to impact on stabilization and growth. These channels include interest rates, domestic savings and in particular, financial savings (time and savings deposits), financial deepening (M2/GDP), and investment.
Behavior of Interest Rates in the Post Liberalization Era
On an ex ante basis, one would expect interest rates in a post liberalization period to be higher and more volatile than when they were controlled. The experience in Uganda has been consistent with this hypothesis in real terms but not in nominal terms. Figure 2 plots the movement of nominal interest rates since 1988. As can be seen, following the partial liberalization of interest rates in November 1992, there was a sharp decline in the entire structure of interest rates including both treasury and bank rates. This, in part, reflects liquidity conditions in the market. The replacement of ceilings based on non-market TB rates to rates based on a more competitive TB market was mainly responsible for this development. The pictorial representation is indicative of the two regime changes mentioned above -the whole sale interest rates in 1992 and latter liberalization of all the interest rates in 1994. Since the market was not fully liberalized until July 1994, interest rates in the fully liberalized environment are only observable from that point of time onwards. Again they show a larger downward trend apart from the significant margin that opened up between lending and deposit rates. The rates since then have been relatively stable. Ongoing --NPART was created as an agency to recover non-performing loans (totaling $69 million) transferred to it from UCB.
Institutional reforms to enhance liquidity management by commercial banks and BOU.
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Ongoing --The Central Depository System to facilitate efficient transfer of government securities, secondary trading and the inter-bank market is in its final stages of installation. Figure 3 below outlines the movement in real rates since January 1990. Real rates, which were largely negative prior to 1992 (apart from 1991-92, when the decline in regulated interest rates lagged behind the decline in inflation) increased sharply in 1993 before coming down to more stable levels in 1994. It is clear from the figure that interest rates have since remained largely positive in real terms. Between 1995 and 1998, while the rates seem to follow a similar trend, significant margins between the lending and the other rates have persisted. This thus raises the question as to whether there have been any efficiency gains derived from liberalization of the interest rates.
Savings mobilization and volume of investment
Total savings in the banking system have maintained an upward trend over the last ten years. As a share of GDP, deposits increased from 3.4 per cent to 8.29 per cent between 1988 and 1997. The rate of growth in the post liberalization period is however, much faster at 10.33 per cent per annum compared to the average of 6.07 per cent per annum in the pre-liberalization years, 1988 to 1992. Furthermore, the contribution of the non-bank private sector to financial savings has been increasing as confidence in the banking system improves (Appendix Table 2 ).
At the same time, however, the habit by urban households to siphon some of the savings into real estate investments and holdings of foreign exchange for wealth and speculative motives still exists even in the post-liberalization period. This is illustrated by the fast growth in real estate and foreign exchange deposits following the liberalization of the current account. Moreover, because of the limited access to financial services, the asset composition of the rural households is to a large extent determined by local economic activities in their area of residence; savings are in form of commodity stocks, livestock and land. This in turn is reflected in the magnitude of the non-monetary sector which contributes to a loss of efficiency in the economy. Ating-Ego, 1996 and Nissanke, 1994) . While the limited awareness of the general public about financial savings has hindered its growth, structural problems within the financial system like in-accessibility of services cannot be exonerated.
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Linked to the above developments, the structure of deposits has also changed. During the period of high inflation and other distortions in the economy, demand deposits, on average, accounted for 70 per cent of total deposits. This has however changed in favor of interest earning medium and long-term deposits. To that effect, the share of savings and time deposits in total deposits has increased from 16.8 per cent recorded in 1988 to the current level of 49 per cent.
The developments outlined above are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that the emergence of positive real interest rates have pulled some savings into the formal financial sector (Shaw, 1973) . However, the level of financial savings of 8.3 per cent of GDP, remains low and compares poorly with those of other countries at similar level of development. In Kenya and Tanzania for instance, financial savings in 1997 were recorded at 38.9 per cent and 13.6 per cent of GDP respectively.
Econometrics. Econometric techniques can be employed to attempt to identify the impact of financial liberalization on Uganda's financial savings and monetary depth. But for the present, such attempts must remain preliminary in that liberalization process has been gradual and the post-liberalization period has spanned for only 4 years. Nevertheless, as observed by Khan and Aftab (1994) , historical data can be used to establish the direction of the relationship between variables of interest to appreciate the need for such reforms. Due to data limitations, referred to above, the small size of the sample used for our analysis may have some shortcomings. These results however are useful in inferring the post liberalization experience.
From a theoretical perspective, one would expect higher interest rates to generate higher savings with the banking system. At the same time, the level of savings is also expected to be influenced by the level of income and the rate of return on such savings relative to the return on alternatives. For Uganda, we focused on the level of bank deposits as a measure of financial savings and the real rate of interest on those deposits as the own rate of return. We experimented with the CPI inflation rate as the opportunity cost. Using quarterly data 1981-97, 3 we successfully identified a long-run cointegrating relationship between financial savings, the own rate of return and GDP. (Inflation was significant in the associated dynamic equation, but with a counterintuitive sign.)
An alternative specification was also employed, with financial depth (log of M2/GDP) as a dependent variable, and employing the rate of depreciation of the Uganda shilling as opportunity cost. (M2 excludes foreign currency deposits, and Ugandan residents can easily substitute between domestic and foreign currency deposits). Here again we found a cointegrating relationship this time with both own return and opportunity cost significant and with the expected sign.
On the strength of these results, in the long run, financial savings in Uganda are sensitive to changes in the real interest rates and income. For that matter, the financial sector policies that have seen Uganda achieve positive real interest rates have contributed positively to the increase in financial savings in the system. Investment. Increased financial saving (or financial deepening) is not viewed as an end in and of itself. The hypothesis is that financial saving are intermediated by the banking sector towards real investment with beneficial effects for the economy The direct evidence on investment and the role of intermediation is mixed. However, this is based on an assessment of data on investment levels from 1988 to 1994---a period which largely encompasses the pre-or early phases of liberalization. This data reveals that Uganda achieved a high rate of economic growth with relatively little investment in productive enterprises and whatever investment that took place was funded by resources mobilized from abroad. Total investment expenditures over this period averaged 12 percent of GDP, of which estimated private investment was about half that level. As mentioned above domestic (financial) savings have been increasing but have been at relatively low levels. This seriously limits the scope and need for financial intermediation to convert domestically mobilized resources into investment. The bulk of investment financing in the 1988-94 period came from foreign savings. Public investment was largely financed by donors' grants and loans. Private investment has been assisted by the emergence, in the 1990s, of a strong inflow of private transfers from abroad which was estimated to exceed $300 million per annum in 1994. 14 2.3 Impact on growth
Uganda has now displayed robust economic growth for more than a decade. It is relatively easy for an economy such as Uganda was in 1988, to achieve short term gains in output even with an unstable macroeconomic environment and a seriously impaired financial sector. However, such gains are likely to be based on existing capacity; to rely little if at all on new investment and to emphasize traditional forms of economic activity rather than the diversification and modernization associated with a more robust economy. Hence the gains in output that Uganda experienced in the period from 1988-1992, could not have been sustained. The fact that the pace of growth has been sustained and has been accompanied by new investment and a diversification of the economy suggests that the government has been successful in bringing about a significant transformation of the economy. It is useful to assess the role that financial sector reforms have played in this success.
A "supply-leading" hypothesis would suggest that financial sector reforms have had a beneficial impact on Uganda's growth prospects by mobilizing financial savings and intermediating them towards productive investment. In an attempt to provide an econometric assessment of this, Kasekende and Ating-Ego (1998) 4 estimated a long-run log-linear cointegrating relationship between industrial output in Uganda and four determinants: bank lending to the industrial sector (positive effect), the bank lending rate, the foreign exchange premium (a proxy for the degree of foreign exchange market regulation), and CPI inflation (all with negative effects.
The positive significance of bank lending and the negative effect of the cost of credit are interpreted as capturing the role of the financial sector in allocating mobilized resources to generating industrial output. enhancing production on the performance of the real sector. This is evidenced by the positive relationship between growth and availability of credit and the negative relationship between growth and cost of credit.
Our conclusion from is that the supply-leading hypothesis is supported in the Ugandan macro-data, and that the reforms that are geared towards improving the efficiency of the sector should promote growth.
Impact on Stabilization
Macroeconomic indicators reveal that Uganda has been successful at achieving and sustaining macro-economic stability. While GDP growth has averaged 7% in the last 10 years, inflation has fallen dramatically from 250% in 1988 and has come down to single digit figures in the past few years. At the same time, there has been a reduction in the external disequilibrium: the current account deficit has declined from 16. 5% of GDP in 1993 5% of GDP in -1994 5% of GDP in to 8.8% in 1997 5% of GDP in -1998 . Uganda has also remained largely unaffected by the contagion effects of the recent global financial crisis.
Taken together, the above developments suggest that, at the very least, liberalization has been achieved without a major disturbance to macro-stability. In part, this is because the capital account was not fully liberalized until 1997 and this has insulated Uganda from rapid capital movements in and out of the country.
The maintenance of macro and, in particular, monetary stability has also been facilitated by the skilful use of fiscal policy to overcome weaknesses in financial markets. A good example is provided by the response of the economy to terms of trade shocks, such as in early 1994 when the prices of coffee, Uganda major export earner, trebled. The shock was absorbed by the economy without a re-emergence of excess demand and inflation. A significant factor underlying the economy's ability to absorb the terms of trade shock was the use of fiscal policies to sterilize the expansionary effect of large inflows of private capital. Taxes on coffee exports were temporarily increased but the increase in revenues was not translated into expenditures and the Government ran up credit balances with the BOU. The use of fiscal policy instruments to manage liquidity reflected the Government's realization that the effectiveness of indirect monetary policy instruments (such as the use of open market operations) was, at least in the short-term, circumscribed by the embryonic state of money markets-the main channel for transmitting the effects of monetary policy to the rest of the economy.
There are three channels, however, through which financial sector liberalization has contributed to macroeconomic stability. These are: (i) an increase in financial sector depth, (ii) restricting the earlier practice of BOU lending to public sector banks (financed largely by printing money) and encouraging instead the use of the inter-bank market, and (iii) reforms in the crop financing system leading to the transfer of the responsibility for coffee financing from the BOU to commercial banks.
One clear demonstration of the impact of financial sector reforms, can be seen in the increase of the ratio of M2 to GDP. This ratio which was around 6% in 1991, has now almost doubled-and reached 11% by June 1998. This increase in monetary depth reflects enhanced confidence in financial instruments due to both the financial liberalization and a more stable macroeconomic environment. This higher level, while still low by comparison to other sub-Saharan African countries, will significantly help to reduce the impacts of fiscal deficits and monetary expansion.
In the wake of the liberalization measures implemented by the Government, there has been a substantive improvement in the liquidity positions of the public sector banks which were previously running large overdrafts at the central bank. UCB and COOP combined had an average liquidity asset ratio (liquid assets/total assets) of -0.5 per cent in the period June 1988-1992. This ratio averaged 46.3 per cent in the period July 1996 to 1998, partially on account of recapitalization of these public banks.
5 These numbers show the profound effect that the change in the rules of the games had on the behavior of public sector banks, and unrestrained credit expansion.
The flow of funds table (Annex 1) also reveals an important change in BOU's role in Uganda. As already mentioned, in the past, the BOU has acted as an apex lending organization for development and crop finance. The BOU is no longer actively involved in crop finance, since coffee exporters have been able to obtain pre-financing from abroad. Negative net flows from the BOU to the private sector indicate this policy shift. The same facts are revealed by reviewing the source of the growth in base money. A review of the balance sheet of BOU shows that the prime source of base money growth is no longer domestic credit expansion (claims of the BOU on the private sector and the Government) as used to be the case prior to 1991. It goes without saying that the impact of investment on growth is determined not only by the quantity of its investment but also by its quality. The next section focuses on the micro level factors driving the efficiency with which the financial sector allocates resources for productive activities.
Impact of Liberalization at the Micro Level
The original and still the main rationale for liberalization is the enhanced efficiency in the allocation of resources (McKinnon, 1973 , Shaw 1973 , but a more qualified view has emerged, recognizing that the presence of imperfect information adversely impacts the ability of the market to allocate resources efficiently by, for example because it constrains effective competition and contributes to periods of systemic instability (Stiglitz, 1996) . The emerging consensus is that financial reforms, to be successful, should be preceded by the introduction of an effective regulatory framework. This section examines the micro-economic effectiveness of the Ugandan liberalization in this context, and advances two hypotheses. Liberalization in Uganda took place in an environment where effective regulations and the capacity to enforce them was still being developed, an environment not uncommon in developing countries. The first hypothesis is that in the absence of adequately developed complimentary institutions, liberalization did not result in effective market competition. The second hypothesis is that despite the limitations on competition posed by the environment, the liberalization of the internal market has improved economic efficiency overall both through an improvement in the allocation of resources and with a reduction in the cost of intermediation.
3.1
Market segmentation and non-competitive behavior in a liberalized environment.
There are several dimensions through which imperfect competition in banking can be observed, including (i) market segmentation within the formal banking system, (ii) constraints on exit from the market, (iii) gaps in the provision of services by the formal financial system and its impact on the nature of the market for informal financial services. We also consider the possible reasons for lack of effective competition--that the initial conditions did not meet the pre-requisites for a successful liberalization--and see how over the period under review market conditions have improved.
Market segmentation
The performance of the banking system, which accounts for more than 95 per cent of the total assets of the formal financial sector, shows many of the characteristics of a market which is segmented and where effective competition is constrained. The preliberalization banking system, with 8 institutions, represented an oligopolistic market structure. There were basically two segments in the pre-liberalization era; the publicly controlled ('state-owned') banks and the subsidiaries of foreign banks (the "ex-colonial" banks) which though in the majority of cases, were partially owned by government had to follow guidelines defined by their head offices abroad. Group 1 (the state-owned) banks had deficient capital, suffered from liquidity and management problems and were, at the time the sector was liberalized, undergoing restructuring programs at the behest of the Government. The ex-colonial (Group 2) banks, on the other hand, did not face these difficulties, and were subject to internal regulations and strict management controls from their head offices. Following the decision by the Government in 1992 to open up the market to competition, the number of banks increased and, with it, the level of competition in the market for banking services at least in the major cities. One indicator of increased competition triggered off in the banking system is revealed in Table 2 which shows the loss of market shares by both Group 1 and Group 2 banks to new entrants: Groups 3 and 4. Group 3 ('prudent') represents new entrants (domestic and foreign) that were generally conservative in their pricing and expansion plans. Group 4 ('aggressive'), on the other hand, represents a set of competitive banks which were aggressive in their policies to capture market share.
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A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 reveals that banks were able to compete with each other more effectively for deposits. As shown in Figure 5 , the losses and gains in the share of deposits broadly corresponds to their pricing: the lower the interest rate paid, relative to the market, the greater the loss in share and vice versa. 6 This latter group also included two institutions which could be said to represent elements of "crony capitalism"; they were owned by politically influential individuals not averse to insider lending.. These banks failed and were taken over by the central bank after a few years of operation and re-sold to a new ownership structure. Lending rate (avg 94-96) Change in share of total assets
Figure 5: Competition For Deposits in the Post Liberalization Period
Note: Groups 1 and 2 banks both lost market shares to Group 4 banks which paid higher rates on deposits. Deposit rates were in the range of 9-13 percent for Group 4 banks compared to about 7 per cent and 10 percent respectively for Group 1 and 2 banks. The latter two groups also lost significant market share to Group 3 in the 1996-98 period when the latter moved to higher interest rate on deposits. The loss of market share was much greater for Group 1 than for Group 2 banks, which is again consistent with their ranking on the deposit rates paid.
As expected, competition is somewhat less effective on the lending side where information problems are more acute. The ex-colonial banks had the lowest (or close to the lowest) rates on loans yet did not see an increase in market share. The state-owned group banks maintained the lowest lending rates throughout the period but still lost market shares to Group 3 and 4 banks. Finally, the aggressive Group 4 banks maintained the highest interest rates in the market during the 1996-98 period, yet gained the largest market shares. On the lending side, market share seems to be insensitive to interest rates changes. The lending data shows a perverse lack of downward slope in demand for credit. The higher interest rates are charged by banks increasing market shares indicating that their average portfolio risk is also increasing as shown later in the section analyzing nonperforming assets. The figures reveal the risk averse behaviour by foreign banks. They are very selective between borrowers and projects funded. This left the lower end of the credit market, where default rates are higher to the Group 3 and Group 4 banks.
The behavior of the ex-colonial banks (Group 2) in the post-liberalization period lends further support to the hypothesis that the environment constrained effective competition. Thus in the period, 1994-96, it could be argued that these banks took advantage of the high interest rates charged by more inefficient banks in the market to increase profitability and rebuild their capital base. The fact they were able to do so without concerns about losing their customer base also reflects an element of monopoly power which lenders have over their borrowers in the presence of imperfect information. 
Insolvent banks and the problem of exit
Another structural weakness that constrained the functioning of a competitive market in Uganda was the presence of insolvent banks that did not exit the system and were allowed to stay in the market. To put matters in perspective, more than half the commercial banks in the financial system experienced losses in 1994 and seven out of the fifteen banks were insolvent. At different points in time, over the period 1996-98, a number of banks were found to be again experiencing liquidity and solvency problems and in violation of prudential guidelines. As shown in Table 1 , since the initiation of interest rate liberalization measures in 1992, only one bank has been closed and liquidated in the conventional sense, in 1992, and that was also in special circumstances which pre-date the liberalization.
Between 1995-98, the BOU has intervened in four other banks and restructured two of them under a new ownership structure, but the extent to which this can be seen as an exit of the distressed banks is questionable. The BOU allowed the original owners to retain a residual value in the restructured banks and has provided loans to restore the banks to positive net worth. This arrangement has helped to avoid any run on the banking system as depositors have not lost any money and in effect have been insulated from the problem of the distressed banks. In addition to concerns about systemic stability, the actions of the BOU have also been influenced by the law which does not allow the central bank to extinguish the share ownership in banks that it has taken over. So while in a sense the original banking entity does not exist, exit in the conventional sense has not 22 taken place-the bank was not liquidated, the owners did not lose their holdings entirely, and depositors have been absolved of their responsibility in their choice of bank.
It appears that both the market and regulators have experienced difficulties in ensuring the exit of insolvent or failed banks in the post-liberalization environment. It is clear that the market allowed insolvent banks to continue to operate. The fact that the four distressed institutions restructured by BOU came from Group 4 banks is indicative of failure by the market to vie for quality banking. As shown in Table 3 above, these banks have maintained high lending rates and high margins, which presumably reflects efforts to cover their high costs of intermediation, and yet still gained market share both for deposits and loans. It appears that lack of effective competition in the market for loans has allowed inefficient banks to continue to operate, when they would otherwise have been forced to close.
Regulators have also had difficulty in closing distressed institutions. Concerns about the impact on systemic stability has been an important factor in constraining BOU from the option of outright closure and liquidation. Other factors, including the legal restrictions mentioned above and political considerations, have also played a role in shaping the eventual form of BOU's intervention.
Gaps in the provision of services
The informal sector for financial services has grown rapidly in the post liberalization period and this is largely attributed to the structural deficiencies in the formal financial system. Surveys carried out in the period 1995-96 suggest the emergence of an increasing gap in the provision of financial services by the formal financial system in particular to small enterprises and in rural areas. It is not entirely clear from the data 8 whether the gap was increasing because of liberalization measures or whether this problem was becoming more clearly identified. However, it is very likely that the rationalization in UCB's branch network and limitations on its ability to extend credit generally, as part of its restructuring program, did restrict access to financial services to small indigenous firms (its main customers) and in some rural areas. Moreover, the low level of monetization in these areas represses credit activity limiting profitable financial intermediation business.
This gap in the provision of financial services is now being filled by informal and semi-formal institutions. The informal sector, which in the pre-liberalization period existed due to severe restrictions and controls on the formal sector, exists today for different reasons. These include provision of financial services to agents that do not have access to the formal sector, and a means of efficiently distributing externally mobilized resources to credit-deficient sectors of the economy. In the pre-liberalization period, the informal and semi-formal sector comprised of institutions whose main purpose was to mobilize savings and included community savings co-operatives and building societies. The post-liberalization informal sector, however, comprises institutions with little intention or success in mobilization of deposits. These institutions rely heavily on own resources and/or grants especially those originating from external sources (donor disbursements). The post-liberalization sector is however much larger and comprises a 23 range of participants including local money lenders, rotating credit co-operatives, community savings co-operatives and loans associations.
Information asymmetries with respect to the small and medium enterprises bias the banking system risk assessment for credit allocation. This, combined with high transaction cost and lack of collateral has limited accessibility of bank credit by the small borrowers. Credit extension from the banking system is therefore concentrated to the large firms that include export marketing, oil companies and the big manufacturers. Kasekende and Ating-Ego (1996) elaborates the variation in access to credit in the informal money markets and in the formal financial system.
Comparison of the banking system to the informal money market indicates existence of large premiums of up to 50 percentage points between the rates charged in the two segments of the financial system for similar projects. Could this imply that intermediation in the informal sector, where rates are higher, is economically more inefficient and hence costly to the economy? The way of doing business in the informal market tends to lower credit risks and the cost of screening and monitoring relative to the formal sector. Whereas the informal sector devotes the bigger proportion of their loan administration costs in pre-screening the clients ability to pay, and not the use of funds, banks devote a considerable amount of resources to project evaluation 9 . This is consistent with the experience in other developing countries (see Aleem 1992). Loan recovery rates are consequently higher in the informal sector than is the case for the formal sector. The degree of inefficiency in intermediation in the informal financial sector (as reflected by the high cost of credit) implies that the extent to which the informal sector can substitute for the banking system is limited. The current development can therefore be interpreted as an exploitation of the deficiencies that still exist in the banking and other institutions of the formal financial sector.
How could more effective competition have been achieved?
The problem of exit and the way in which it limits effective competition might have been avoided if liberalization had been slowed until the pre-conditions for establishing a more competitive environment were established. The greater emphasis being placed since 1995 on institutional development, including enhancing BOU's capacity to supervise and regulate banks and ensuring greater transparency about the health of the banking sector, seems therefore appropriate. During this phase a lot of resources have been devoted to training bankers in both the public and private sectors to operate more effectively in a liberalized environment. The public sector banks, which were restructured in Phase III, were also not in a position to be effective players in a liberalized competitive market. Taking all these factors together, it is likely that with improved information flows, stronger enforcement of regulations, better trained bankers and regulators, and healthier banks to start with, may have provided better initial conditions for liberalizing interest rates.
Efficiency of liberalized financial markets
The second theme we wish to assess is the impact of liberalization on the efficiency of the financial sector. The hypothesis is that despite the limitations on 24 effective competition, the liberalization of the internal market has improved economic efficiency. There are several ways in which this hypothesis could be tested. One of these is to review the allocation of resources by the financial sector to assess the extent to which it has shown improvements since the liberalization. In essence one would expect that an efficiently functioning financial sector to be allocating funds it has mobilized to projects and sectors with the highest risk adjusted returns. Limitations of data availability make it difficult to directly measure the efficiency of resource allocation and its movement over time. However there are two broad measures which provide some indirect, if limited, support to the view that there has been an improvement in the efficiency of resource allocation One is the broad direction of credit flows provided by the sector. The other is the decline in the incidence of non-performing loans.
Another alternative is to look at the problem from the point of view of the internal efficiency of the market. One measure of a competitive efficient market is that price (interest rates) should equal marginal cost (of intermediation). Again available data does not permit a bank by bank, let alone a project by project, assessment using this criteria. However the movement in interest rate spreads (both ex-ante and ex-post) are surrogate measures from which some approximate inferences can be drawn about the costs and therefore the efficiency of bank intermediation. Here the evidence points to a deterioration in the estimated efficiency of intermediation; or put another way it suggests that the Ugandan banking system has yet to enjoy gains arising from liberalization of the financial sector.
Efficiency of resource allocation
The sectoral allocation of credit presented in Figure 6 illustrates the changes in the direction of credit over the liberalization period. One notable development here is that the share of credit directed to agriculture has declined from 33.7 per cent to 19.4 per cent in 1997. One could associate this development with the declining contribution of the agricultural sector to economic activity. However, on further scrutiny, the high shares in the past reflected the efforts by government to award preferential treatment to the sector under direct controls. However, in the post-liberalization era, a significant proportion of banks considered agricultural activities as highly risky with no insurance schemes developed to mitigate the risks. And moreover, as the lucrative pre-financing of coffee exports shifted to offshore external financing sources, commercial banks opted for more expedient financing of trade and commerce, the shares of which have increased from about 39.4 per cent in 1991 to over 50 per cent in 1997. And with the expansion of the industrial sector, manufacturing has also substantially benefited from credit allocation with its share increasing from 12.6 per cent to 23.4 per cent between 1993 and 1997 respectively. 
Non-performing assets as a measure of the (in)efficiency of resource allocation.
The extent of the bad debts in the commercial banks balance sheets (see Table 4 ), even after the restructuring of UCB 10 and several other banks, suggests existence of a significant misallocation of credit, which is detrimental to the real sector performance.
With the removal of credit ceiling favoring certain sectors of the economy and reduction of political intervention in the banking system, the banks of Group 2 and Group 3 largely base their lending decision on commercial viability. The incidence of nonperforming assets, as a percentage of the loan portfolio, has declined for Groups 1, 2 and 3 and for the sector as a whole. By this measure, for the banking system, a lot of ground has been gained in efficiency of credit allocation; the interpretation is that loans are being allocated to more productive uses that allow the user to repay the loan. The conclusions that one can draw from the data showing a significant reduction in the incidence of non-performing assets needs, however, to be qualified. First, it should be noted that a loan that has not been repaid does not necessarily mean that the resources have been wasted. Second, if one takes the view that the preponderance of loans made prior to liberalization were not political loans and were taken with the intent to repay (particularly for Group 2 and 3 banks) then an increase in the percentage of performing loans could also be due to policy or institutional changes which may have nothing to do with efficiency of resource allocation: for example the improvement could be due to a change in the culture of repayment of bank loans or due to a shift in loans to projects or sectors (following a reduction in directed lending) where the economic risks are lower.
Group 4 (the aggressive) banks provide an exception to the trend of a reduction in the incidence of non-performing loans. They are characterized by a high incidence of insider lending and granting credit to more speculative ventures which are prepared to pay high interest charges, but the risk of default is disproportionately greater. Group 4 banks have therefore seen a fast growth in deposits accompanied by similar growth in the non-performing assets (see Table 3 ). As shown in Table 4 , Group 4 banks, which have been aggressive in their conduct of banking business, have high levels of NPAs averaging 15.15 per cent for the 2-year period to June 1998, compared with 8.7 percent for the 1992-96 period. This is why higher rates they are charging on their loans are not translating into profits and they are barely able to keep afloat. In fact the high interest rates could be making matters worse for them by attracting more risky customers.
Bank margins and the efficiency of intermediation
As mentioned above, the movement in interest rate spreads (both ex-ante and expost) are measures from which some approximate inferences can be drawn about the efficiency of bank intermediation. Ex-ante spreads, which were provided in Table 3 above, are calculated from the contractual rates charged on loans and rates paid on deposits. However, they are biased to the extent that differences in perceived risks are reflected in ex-ante-yields. The ex-post spreads, calculated as the difference between a bank's interest revenues and their actual interest expenses, are potentially free of this deficiency (Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998 ).
This measure is not free of problems that may be relevant for the application to Uganda. First a reduction (increase) in the intermediation margin may not always signal an improvement (deterioration) in bank efficiency. In particular, net interest income may decline (increase) due to an increase (decrease) in non-performing assets. To overcome this an adjusted intermediation margin is also calculated where total assets are adjusted for non-performing assets. Both the margin and the adjusted margin are estimated for the Uganda case in Table 5 . 27 Other shortcomings of the estimated measure may arise from lack of a uniform accounting system for all the banks in the system. 11 Whereas some banks record interest income on accrual basis, others do it on cash basis, making it difficult to compare figures across banks. Comparisons are further complicated by the treatment of tax. For several commercial banks, the accounts reviewed do not reflect the amount paid in taxes. Moreover, some banks enjoy a tax exemption under the Ugandan Investment Code. At a macro-level, banks in Uganda are subject to corporate income tax currently at the rate of 30 per cent under the Income tax bill. Other forms of taxation facing the banking system are in form of the reserve and liquidity requirements. Both the reserve and liquidity requirements are applicable to all banks and hence affects them uniformly.
Over the post-liberalization period, reserve requirements at the central bank, which do not earn interest, have been revised only once, in 1996 by one percentage point to the current level of 8 per cent and 9 per cent for demand and, time and savings deposits respectively. Notwithstanding these qualifications, the estimates presented in Table 5 , suggest some useful and interesting conclusions. Source: Bank of Uganda, Research Department Records Note: Intermediation margin (1) = Net interest income as a percentage of total assets Intermediation margin (2) = Net interest income as a percentage of (total assets less non-performing assets) Net profit ratio = net income as percentage of total assets Net income = net interest income + non-interest income -overheads -loan loss provisioning
The analysis presented in Table 5 reveals that the Ugandan Banking system has high intermediation margins and, more critically, these increased from 3.84 per cent to 5.75 per cent over the post-liberalization period, 1994-98. This intermediation margin is high compared with levels estimated at 3.5 per cent for the global banking system or 4.8 11 The net interest income is estimated from the following accounting identity:
Before tax profits = net interest income + non-interest income-overheads-loan loss provisions.
Overheads in this identity, account for the bank's entire overhead associated with all its activities; loan loss provisioning measures actual provisioning, while non-interest income reflects income from non-lending activities that banks also engage in such as investment lending and payment services.
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per cent for Africa (Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998) . The adjusted margin also reveals a steady increase suggesting that the increase in the margin cannot be attributed exclusively to the reduction in non-performing assets. The steady increase in the margin in the period 1994 to 1998 suggests that the Ugandan banking system has yet to benefit from liberalization of the financial sector.
A group by group analysis of the banking system portrays some interesting patterns in ex post intermediation margins and ex ante interest spreads (Figure 7) . First, the intermediation margins have been on an upward trend across all banks with the prudent Group 3 banks recording the fastest increase and aggressive Group 4 banks suffering a decline in margins in 1996.
Second, a comparison of Tables 5 and 3 reveals that as ex ante interest rate spreads narrowed for Group 2 and 3 banks, the ex post intermediation margins were widening and their profits were also increasing. On the contrary, the aggressive Group 4 banks, which have throughout the period maintained high ex ante spreads, have barely improved on their ex-post intermediation margin and as a group have experienced negative before tax profits. Similarly the state-owned Group 1 banks, which raised their interest rate spreads by lowering deposit rates and maintaining high lending rates, the ex ante spreads rose (from 5.3 per cent to a peak of 9.6 per cent in 1996) as did their ex post margins banks but this was not sufficient to make up for the substantive loss in customers and market share, and they remained unprofitable for the period under review. The factors underlying the profitability of Group 2 and 3 banks is worth reviewing. The ex-colonial Group 2 banks are much more efficient in liquidity and risk management. Moreover, in addition to being subjected to additional surveillance by their Head Offices abroad, they can also import management skills. Not surprisingly, it seems the interest rate adjustments (on both deposits and loans) were designed to ensure consistent net intermediation margins. Although the prudent Group 3 banks gradually increased deposit rates over the post liberalization era, their lending rates have been gradually reduced. This resulted in declining interest spreads over the post-liberalization era. However, ex post intermediation margins have been increasing, despite the interest rate adjustment. This increase reflects both a halving of the rate of loan default and a substantive increase in their market share (gained at the expense of Group 1 and 2 banks) with a resulting spreading of costs.
Indeed the public sector banks, formerly publicly owned and commanding the biggest share of the market proved too big to fail in spite of their inefficiencies. While the solution has been to restructure and re-capitalize these banks as explained above, the implicit protection enjoyed by these banks, allowed inefficiencies to persist and promoted non-competitive behavior. Indeed it could be argued that some banks (Group 1 and 4) have kept interest rates and ex-ante high just to remain afloat and cover their high costs, while the other banks (in Groups 2 and 3) have benefited from the atmosphere of relatively high lending rates-they have not reduced their lending rates as much as they could have and the resulting high margins has allowed them to earn profits which are very high by international standards.
12 Unlike a competitive market, prices (lending rates) are being determined not by the most efficient suppliers but are being driven by the needs of the most inefficient ones. Inefficiencies persist and the banks' customers are paying for them.
13
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Subsidies through the financial system This final section provides some partial information as to the size and trends in quasi-fiscal subsidization of the public enterprises (PEs, or equivalently SOEs) through the financial system. It represents a partial approach to the wider question of who gained and who lost from the process of financial sector liberalization in Uganda. 13 There is difficulty in interpreting the trend of Non-Perfoming Assets (NPAs) and bank profitability given the banking environment in Uganda. In an environment of poor accounting, auditing and a weak regulatory authority, there will be a tendency by banks to withhold information, improperly classify loans and as a result, make inappropriate provisions. Hence, the NPAs are understated and earnings over-stated. Reduced profitability may simply reflect the imposition of stricter loan classification and provisioning requirements. Furthermore, in the case of Group 1, a substantial portfolio of NPAs of UCB were removed from its books and replaced with government bonds which have greatly increased its earning capacity.
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subsidies to the SOE sector averaged Ush 154 billion per year at 1993 prices, (that is about $180 million at the 1993 exchange rate). The rest was accounted for by indirect subsidies. The figures for 1995 and 1996 suggest that the overall level of subsidies remained largely unchanged at the 1993 level before declining significantly in 1997 to Ush 123 billion (estimated at current prices).
The largest amount of subsidies in the 1991-93 period were related to the terms on which SOEs borrowed funds from the banking system or the central bank. There have been two broad types of such subsidies. The first involves the price at which funds have been made available. Thus SOEs have benefited from subsidized, below market, interest rates on loans made available to them through the Treasury, the state-owned commercial banks or development banks. Financial institutions have also benefited from funds made available to them at low or zero rates. For example, UCB, the preferred bank for Government transactions, had access to large deposits from the state and other SOEs on which it was not obliged to pay interest. Similarly, UCB and other state-owned development banks benefited from donor loans provided to them at highly concessional terms with the Government bearing the exchange risk and providing guarantees at zero cost.
The second source of quasi-rents derived by SOEs from borrowed funds involved arrears on loan payments. In the past SOEs benefited extensively by going into arrears on loan repayments without facing interest or late payment charges on these arrears. In many cases the Government took over debt servicing and converted the debt into equity. In the case of financial institutions, a common practice involved the Government taking over bad loans these institutions had made even though no Government guarantees were involved and the bad loans had been fully provisioned for in their accounts.
As shown in Appendix Table A4 , indirect equity support, including the write-off of bad loans which were already provided for, or conversion of debt to equity, amounted in the 1991-93 period to an annual average of Ush 55 billion. This was equivalent to 35 percent of total estimated subsidies to the SOE sector. At the same time the benefits from loans provided on soft terms by the Government were estimated at Ush 27 billion. These two categories together accounted for 52% of total subsidies, or in value terms approximately $90 million.
The size of the estimated subsidies in the above sample of SOEs gives an indication of the quasi-rents that the SOE sector stood to lose in 1991-93 as a result of financial sector liberalization. A large part of these quasi-rents derived from soft terms on which loans were provided and Government intervention to rescue firms and banks in financial difficulty by writing off bad loans or by converting debt to equity.
A comparison of the subsidies in the 1991-93 period with the estimates made for the post-liberalization period-the years 1995 through 1997-raises the possibility of an underlying resistance by those who lost out in the process of liberalization.. The size of subsidies to SOEs given by the state in the form of debt to equity conversion of loans or unloading of non-performing assets (in the case of financial institutions) has declined steadily. However subsidies in the form of loans provided on soft terms have increased substantially from Ush 27 billion in the 1991-93 period to Ush 71 billion in 1997. One possible reason for this development may be that some of the mechanisms for providing 31 quasi rents, and which also distort the market allocation process, may still be in place some 7 years after the Government initiated the liberalization of the financial sector. However one cannot exclude the possibility that the rise in (real) interest rates following deregulation may well have badly hit those SOEs which were not prepared for the increases and have been slow to adjust. They have built up arrears which they are still struggling to remove.
Policy implications and conclusions
In the wake of financial sector liberalization and complementary reform measures introduced by the Government of Uganda, there has been a major transformation in the structure and performance of the financial system and a significant improvement in the confidence in domestic financial instruments.
There are many dimensions in which the positive impact of interest rate liberalization and associated measures can be seen: Monetary depth, as measured by the ratio of money supply (M2) to GDP, while it still remains low by African and developing country standards, has almost doubled as have total deposits as a share of GDP. The structure of deposits has also changed and the share of time and savings deposits in total deposits has jumped from 17 percent to almost 50 percent. An assessment of the available evidence also supports the view that financial sector liberalization has contributed to macroeconomic stability and the high rate of economic growth by increasing financial savings and monetary depth, enhancing financial discipline, and shifting the responsibility for crop financing from the Government to the commercial banks.
At the sector level, there has been a significant decline in the incidence of nonperforming assets. Associated with this improvement in the culture of honoring financial contracts, there has been a substantial reduction in the role of the state in allocating and intermediating financial savings and in its equity holding in commercial banks. Policy changes have also contributed to a significant improvement in the competitive environment-while UCB remains a major player, the level of concentration in the banking system has fallen substantially, a large number of new private banks have entered the market, and there has been a leveling of the playing field between stateowned and private sector banks. Last but not least the standards of bank supervision and transparency in the banking system have improved substantially, as has the confidence of the authorities to intervene and expeditiously address the incidence of insolvent or illiquid banks.
At the same time liberalization has imposed certain costs on the economy. First of all the initial conditions and the sequencing of the reforms have resulted in a costly adjustment process. The financial sector was liberalized before prudential supervision and regulations had been adequately strengthened. As a consequence, unsound banks were allowed to enter the financial system and their shortcomings were not expeditiously addressed. Their presence increased the cost of intermediation and led eventually to costly bailouts by the central bank.
Second, the presence of asymmetric information and the absence of institutions (adequate accounting standards, credit information agencies, etc) which could help alleviate this problem constrained effective competition, resulting in higher margins and 32 interest rates with attendant economic costs (including the adverse impact on growth). Interest rates, in this environment, appeared to be determined not by the costs facing the most efficient supplier but instead by the most inefficient ones-a complete contradiction of competitive behavior.
There is also evidence that in the post liberalization period, micro enterprises and farmers in small rural communities found it more difficult to access services provided by the formal financial system. The gap in the provision of financial services is being filled increasingly by the informal sector.
Finally, liberalization in Uganda has involved the transfer of quasi-rents from the Government (including SOEs) and well heeled borrowers (who have often been able to avoid repayment) to depositors and banks. This transfer has been facilitated by the availability of foreign aid to the Government to cover its budget deficit.
The Ugandan experience suggests the following policy implications. A gradual phased liberalization can help reduce the possible adverse effects of financial sector liberalization on other sectors of the economy. As was noted in the body of the paper, while real interest rates and margins were high, Uganda has attained both low inflation and high growth over the post-liberalization period.
Skilful co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy can help the economy going through liberalization to overcome weaknesses in the financial markets. This is true even in the event of external shocks. For instance during the coffee boom of 1994/95, the Ugandan authorities were able to use the fiscal instrument to sterilize the large foreign exchange inflows without the re-emergence of excess demand and inflation.
The optimal timing and sequencing of financial sector liberalization cannot be generalized: the Uganda experience suggests that there is a trade-off between the gains from early liberalization which could facilitate macro-stabilization and the advantages of waiting for effective regulatory framework and macro-stability to be in place to avoid risks of excessive credit expansion, imprudent behavior and associated bank distress.
To reduce the costs of liberalization, more attention needs to be paid to improve the flow of information in the market, the exit of distressed banks, and measures to improve efficiency by avoiding over-banking. The Ugandan banking system has suffered under the reforms as is evidenced by the incidence of distress in the system and the trend of profitability especially post liberalization. Financial liberalization can have adverse effects on the domestic financial system especially when reforms are not preceded by the introduction of an effective regulatory framework to ensure quality at entry and expedite the exit of insolvent banks. To avoid an excess number of banks, the Government, should also consider raising the minimum capital requirements.
Even under imperfect market conditions which constrain competition, liberalization can, however, still increase economic efficiency through improved allocation of resources.
-Regulators need to be supported by strong and modern laws so as to take appropriate action and to facilitate orderly workouts of insolvencies and loan foreclosures. In addition to these laws however, accountability of the regulators to the public would not 33 only make regulators responsible for their action but also strengthen their actions by making them more transparent.
-Some of the benefits of liberalization of the financial sector may be constrained by resistance from those who may be adversely affected by the process. 
